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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I
The Trial Court erred in granting specific performance of
the real estate contract because Plaintiff failed to perform
a condition precedent found in the contract and because
Plaintiff has not himself failed to discharge his obligations
before seeking equitable relief.
PQIN^ II
Plaintiff, at the time of the execution of the purchase
agreement had no authority from co-tenants to sell the
property, and, therefore, the contract was invalid.
POIN^ III
The parties, by their conduct, established
a relationship as joint venturers.
STATEMENT OF THE CA^E
A)

Nature of the Case.

This is an action by Plaintiffs

upon a contract to purchase real property.

The Plaintiffs seek

damages, costs, attorney's fees and specific performance.

The

Defendants deny Plaintiffs1 allegations and prayer for relief and
allege affirmatively among other things that the Plaintiffs did
not have the authority to enter into the agreement, and both parties failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement
Plaintiff seeks to enforce, when in fact the parties treated the
real estate development as a joint venture.
B)

Course of Proceedings.

The matter was tried before the

Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen without a jury.
C)

Disposition in the Trial Court.

follows:
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The ^rial Court ruled as

(1) That the contract between the parties was binding
and enforceable.
(2) The balance due on the contract was $149,500.
(3) Any possible defect in title or the ability of
Plaintiff, Mark McCracken to convey title because of defective power-of-attorney was cured by the execution, delivery
of a warranty deed recorded 6 years after the date of the
agreement.
(4) That Defendants were required to execute a past due
promissory note and a trust deed to secure the promissory
note as provided in the agreement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mark McCracken and the Defendants were acquaintances prior to
the entry into the agreement which is the subject of this litigation and had had some prior business dealings with each other.
(TR 42)

The parties commenced negotiations with each other con-

cerning the property approximately six months prior to the date of
the agreement.

Although Plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence

showing their title to the property, (TR 35 lines 16 - 20, TR 36
lines 2 - 11) Exhibit 1 recites that the owners of the property
are Mark McCracken, Doris McCracken and Kedrick and Lila P.
McCracken, and Exhibit 6 indicates that Kedrick McCracken and Lila
P. McCracken each own an undivided one-fourth interest in the property.
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On the 13th day of July, 1978, Kedrictk McCracken and Lila P.
McCracken conveyed their interest in the subject property to themselves in trust as "trustees" of the Kedrick McCracken Family
Revocable Trust,
13, 1978.

The deed was recorded ih Cache County on July

(See Ex. 6)

(TR 15 line 18 - $5 sets forth the

interest of Plaintiffs)
Plaintiff, Mark McCracken and Defendants by agreement
selected Attorney Scott Barrett of Logan, Utah, to draw the
agreement between the parties.

(Ex. 1) (^R 20)

one-half of the attorney's fee.

Each party paid

(TR 20) the parties testified

that they each contributed to the provisions incorporated in the
agreement.

(TR 41)

Mark McCracken indicated that he and Jerry

Downs on separate occasions made changes to the agreement.
41)

(TR

McCracken read and understood the terms of the agreement. (TR

42) Further, Mark McCracken testified at TR page 42 as follows:
Q.

And that each of the conditions that were contained
in the contract were agreed to in the office and
discussed between all of you?

A.

Yes.

Jerry Downs essentially confirms this testimony.

(TR 72)

The agreement was prepared in draft form by Attorney Scott Barrett
of Logan, Utah.

(TR 12)

However, it was not signed in his pre-

sence and he was unaware that the agreement had been signed or
recorded.

(TR 115)

After conveying their undivided one-palf interest to themselves as trustees, Kedrick and Lila P. MbCracken, as individuals,
made and executed a special power of attorney to Mark McCracken
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purportedly for the purpose of allowing him to sell their property.

The contract was executed on the 19th day of October, 1978

by Mark McCracken in behalf of himself and as an attorney for
Kedrick McCracken, Lila P. McCracken individually and Doris E.
McCracken.
The contract provided as follows:

(See a copy attached as an

addendum hereto.)
1.

A representation that Mark McCracken was the owner of the

property.
2.

That the seller agreed to sell the property with a nomi-

nal downpayment of $500.00 and the balance to be paid in the form
of a note secured by a deed of trust payable in full on the 1st of
September, 1983.
3.

Buyers shall be the developers and sub-dividers and the

sellers shall have no part in nor control over the sub-division or
sale of the lots.
4.

Closing of this agreement by the sellers deeding the sub-

ject property to the buyers and buyers delivering their note and
deed of trust to the sellers shall be on or before November 20,
1978 at the sole election of sellers. (Emphasis ours)
5.

Buyers shall pay all sub-division costs.

6.

Sellers agree to provide buyers with a policy of title

insurance within ninety (90) days after the execution of the
agreement.
7.
parties.

The agreement constituted the entire agreement of the
(See addendum attached hereto.)
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The agreement was recorded on the day it is dated October 19,
1978, in the office of the Recorder of Cache County, Utah.
On the date specified for closing (November 20, 1 978) sellers
failed to make an election to proceed withj the contract and failed
to deed the property to buyers.

Buyers in turn failed to execute

a note and trust deed to secure the balance due,
Mccracken's testimony TR 31, 32, 43)

(Mark

(Jerry Downs' testimony TR

85, 103, 18) (Scott Barrett's testimony TR 115, 118)

Attorney

Scott Barrett testified upon cross examination that he was never
asked to nor did he prepare a deed to Greaves and Downs (TR 114),
a promissory note or a trust deed (TR 114), nor did he receive
from any of the parties an election that they wanted to proceed
with the agreement.

(TR 115)

Barrett further testified that

nothing in his file indicated that a policy of title insurance was
ever ordered.
Barrett concedes that the transaction was never completed (TR
14) and that the parties thereafter operated under an arrangement
different from the terms and conditions of the contract.

(TR 118)

The parties sub-divided the property, I not as seller and
purchaser, but as joint participants in the management of the venture.

(See Ex. 4)

Mark McCracken executed the owner's dedication

for himself, his mother Doris McCracken and his aunt and uncle,
Kedrick McCracken and Lila McCracken.

The improvements were made

to the property by Greaves and Downs at their expense.
The first sub-divided lot was sold by the parties on the 21st
day of August, 1980.

(Ex. 8)

By reason of the fact that the
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property had not been deeded to Greaves and Downs, all parties
jointly executed a warranty deed to purchaser Progressive Homes,
Mark McCracken signed for himself and as an attorney-in-fact for
his mother Doris and as an attorney-in-fact for Kedrick and Lila
McCracken individually and as trustees.
On the 19th day of September three more lots were sold to
Progressive Homes with Cecil Mark McCracken signing the deeds, for
himself and as an attorney-in-fact for Doris McCracken, Kedrick
McCracken and Lila P. McCracken.

No mention was made of the

status of Kedrick and Lila McCracken as trustees.

(Although

marketable title was not conveyed, no one questioned the fact.)
Checks in payment of the lots were made by Progressive Homes
paying one-half to Cecil Mark McCracken directly and one-half to
Greaves and Downs directly.

(See Ex. 9 and 10)

Upon cross exami-

nation Mark McCracken testified as follows:
Q.
A.

You just received the money didn't you?
I received the money. But I gave the lots for the
money.

McCracken further testified on direct examination from his
counsel as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

What if anything did you do with respect to the sale
of the lots?
I signed some papers to release the lots.
Who presented these papers to you?
Jerry Downs.
And, why did you do that?
So they could release the lots to sell them... had
to be done to sell the lots.
Did you obtain any benefit from that?
One-half of the sale of the lots that were sold.
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On January 15, 1981, the Plaintiff Mark McCracken and the
Defendants went into the office of Attorney Scott Barrett.
Exactly which parties went in was not agreed upon by all parties
at the trial.

However, a note dated January 16, 1981r in Scott

Barrett's office indicates that the purchase agreement was picked
up in draft form and signed and recorded.

(See Plaintiff's Ex. 11)

Attorney Barrett testified and Exhibit 11 confirms his testimony
and reveals that the transaction was never completed.
(Mccracken's testimony TR 31, 32, 43; Jerry Downs1 testimony TR
85; Barrett's testimony TR 114, 115, 118)
Attorney Barrett explained to Use parties that if Exhibit 1
was to be treated as a purchase sai --•*•- t there should be ai I
escrow account set up.

The parties present stated to Attorney

Barrett that they "preferred to leave the bituation as it was and
not have deeds exchange hands at that time and that whenever a lot
was sold that the parties would all have to sign so there was no
problem passing title in that way".

(Third paragraph Ex. 11)

McCracken confirms this testimony at TR page 62.
There were no further sales of lots from this tract of ground
after January 15, 1981.
On April 23, 1984, 5% years after the agreement was signed
Kedrick McCracken, Lila McCracken and Doris E. McCracken conveyed
their interest in the property to Mark Cecil McCracken by special
warranty deed.

(See Ex. 7)
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The property described in the contract which was not subdivided was either farmed by Mark McCracken or was leased to
another farmer by Mark McCracken.

(TR 32)

He retained all pro-

fits from the farming operations and paid the water taxes.
(TR 57)
The purchase agreement in paragraph 1 provides that upon the
closing of the sale and McCracken deeding the property to the
buyers, buyers were to deliver their note and mortgage to
McCrackens.

However, McCracken at page 33 of the transcript

testifies as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.

Have you been at all times ready and able to deliver
clear title to Messrs. Greaves and Downs upon payment
of the remaining $149,500.00?
Yes.
And you are capable of doing that even now?

A.

Yes.

At a post-judgment hearing to require the Defendants to execute a note and trust deed evidence was presented to the effect
that McCracken had assigned his interest to Zions1 First National
Bank on the 10th day of March, 1982, and further had executed a
trust deed encumbering the subject property in the amount of
$92,525.00 on the 27th day of March, 1984.

(Ex. 13, 14)

The decree of the Trial Court entered on the 12th day of
November, 1985, required the Defendants to execute a trust deed
and mortgage that was due and payable on the 1st day of September,
1983, to enable Plaintiffs to have the foreclosure remedies provided by law.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTSJ
Point I.
1.

The agreement entered into between the parties in 1978

contains a condition precedent which was never fulfilled by the
Plaintiff who now seeks specific performanbe.
2.

p] ai ntlff has failed to discharge his own obligations

under the contract and did not come into the Court having himself
done equity.
3.

Plaintiffs1 acts in mortgaging the property are incon-

sistent with his present claim of specific performance.
The Plaintiffs1 5% year delay in the commencement of
this acti' - -..: . •

si time there has been an approximate 50%

devaluation in the land bars Plaintiff from seeking specific performance constitutes latches.
Point II.
Mark McCracken attempted to negotiate the contract for himself and three other persons.

An undivided one-half of the

interest in the property was held in a family trust agreement.
The trustees of a trust cannot delegate the discretion vested in
them to another person, and, therefore, Mayk McCracken had no
authority

> represent all parties in the contract negotiations.

Point III.
The parties, by their conduct,

*' •• -?n^ * -*

-^"H4--

^ h i p as

joint venturers and as such the termination of the joint venture
by the parties leaves each party with the ownership of the property they had prior to the venture and each having made a profit
from the venture.
-11-

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.
A.

The contract contained a condition precedent to be per-

formed by McCrackens prior to seeking performance by Defendants.
Paragraph 3 of the agreement states as follows:
"The closing.of this agreement by sellers deeding the subject property to the buyers and buyers delivering their
note and trust deed to the sellers shall be on or before
November 20, 1978 at the sole election of the sellers."
The contract was dated and recorded on the 19th day of
October, 1978.
All parties1 indicated that on the closing date of November
20, 1978, the seller McCracken made no election to proceed with
the agreement.

(See Mccracken's Testimony TR 31, 32, and 46)

Therefore, the express condition precedent found in the
contract was never fulfilled by the Plaintiff.

The Trial Court in

its findings found in paragraph 3 as follows:
"Although the contract requires that a note and trust
deed would be executed by the buyers evidencing and
securing the remaining unpaid balance due under the
contract, no such note or trust deed was ever executed
or delivered to plaintiffs and consequently no warranty
deed was executed and delivered to the defendants conveying
the property."
It is apparent that the Trial Court in viewing the matter
found that the burden was upon the Defendants, Greaves and Downs
to tender a note and trust deed, rather than following the clear
import of the paragraph which states that the seller, McCracken
shall have the sole election as to whether or not to proceed with
the agreement.
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On January 15, 1981, the Plaintiff an<^ one or more of the
Defendants met in Attorney Barrett's Offict.

Attorney Barrett

advised the Defendants that if they were to have a binding sales
agreement the agreement should be placed iiji escrow with a deed
from McCracken to Greaves and Downs.
The parties stated that they preferred to leave the situation
as it was and not exchange deeds yet and tfliat upon the sale of any
lot all parties were to convey the property.

(See Ex. 11 and TR

116 - 118)
The testimony of the parties never attempted to vary the
terms of the contract, and, therefore, thejcontract is not ambiguous.

It is further evident from the testimony of the parties

that Plaintiff was never willing to convey | the property in order
to get performance of the contract.

Plaintiff, therefore, failed

to tender performance under the condition precedent of the
agreement and the agreement is therefore unenforceable.
In Kimball v. Campbell, Utah, 699 P.2c^ 714, (1985), this
Court held that a contracts interpretation is a question of law
where no extrinsic evidence of intent is introduced.
the fact that

By reason of

the contract's interpretation is a question of law,

this Court may review the Trial Court's action under a correctness
standard.

See Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., Utah, 603

P.2d 803 (1974).
A review of paragraph 3 of the agreemejnt shows that the
seller, McCracken had the sole election givjen to him to proceed
with the agreement.

Having never made that! election in writing or
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by tendering a deed it is obvious that McCracken failed to perform
the condition precedent.

We must ask ourselves whether or not

Defendants had a right to specific performance absent an election
by the Plaintiff to proceed with the sale.
In Baxter v. Camelot Properties, Utah, 622 P.2d 808, (1981),
this Court upheld the Trial Court's judgment denying Plaintiff
specific performance allowing her to purchase a condominium unit
by reason of the fact that Baxter failed to perform as required by
the terms of her agreement.

See also Huck v. Hayes, Utah 560 P.2d

1142, (1977), where this Court held that:
(I)t is fundamental that a party to a contract should
obtain no advantage from the fact that he is himself
unable to perform. Since the defendant has not come
forth with the agreed title insurance policy demonstrating that he could convey a clear and marketable
title asof the proposed closing date, March 8, 1974,
he could neither demand payment by the plaintiff on
that date, nor claim that the latter was in default
for failing to make the payment.
See also Kiahtipes v. Mills, Utah, 649 P.2d 9 (1982).

Branstetter

v. Cox, Kansas, 496 P.2d 1345 (1972) and Bird v. Casa Royal West,
Nevada, 624 P.2d 17 (1981) and Rubber, Inc. v. Jenkins, Colorado,
570 P.2d 1317 (1977).
McCracken testified that he did not rely on anyone else to
complete the sale (TR 31), and, therefore, he is responsible for
his compliance with the terms and agreements of the contract.
B.

Further, the Plaintiff is not entitled to specific per-

formance because he has failed to discharge his own obligations.
Plaintiff brought this action, not upon the promissory note
and mortgage contemplated by the agreement, but upon his original
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agreement which is an agreement to make a promissory note and
mortgage upon his performance by delivering a deed at the time of
the execution of the contract.
knowing its contents

He admits reading the contract and

and further admits t^hat he was capable of

delivering a deed and title insurance but he failed to proceed
further with the contract. (TR 42, 43, 46)1
When asked in January of 1981 by Attqirney Barrett if he
wished to complete the contract as contemplated he indicated that
he did not wish to convey the property at that time but wished to
operate as they were doing on an informal basis.
The Plaintiff commenced this action seeking the equitable
remedy of specific performance.

However, Plaintiff had failed to

discharge his own obligations prior to seelking such relief.
As indicated in paragraph A above the Plaintiff had failed to
make the election under paragraph 3 to clo se the agreement,
Further, Plaintiff failed to draw or have drawn the appropriate
deeds, mortgages to complete the transacti on.

(TR 33, 46)

In

addition thereto the subsequent conduct of| the Defendant violated
paragraph 2 in retaining control over the subdivision and sale of
the lots.

(TR 24, 25, 52, 54)

The Plaintiff also violated

paragraph 6 of the agreement in failing tol provide a policy of
title insurance within 90 days after the execution of the
agreement or at any other time.

The fact of the matter is that

the Plaintiff, after executing the contract of sale, encumbered
the property to Zions First National Bank thereby making it
impossible for clear title to pass to the Pefendant.
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See Fischer

v. Johnson, Utah, 525 P.2d 45 (1974), Creer v. Thurman, Utah, 581
P.2d 149 (1978).
Each of these acts on the part of the Plaintiff is contrary
to Plaintiff's obligation to discharge his obligations under the
agreement.
Plaintiffs1 Complaint seeks a money judgment and for declartory relief requiring the Defendants to execute a note and trust
deed to thereafter be foreclosed.

The Trial Court concluded in

December of 1985 that the contract was a binding contract and
ordered the Defendants to execute a promissory note and trust deed
with a due date of September 1, 1983, so that the same might be
enforced by a Plaintiff, who prior to that time had failed to perform the agreement himself.
In Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, Utah, 621 P.2d 1240, (1980),
this Court held that where a remedy is sought in equity, as a predicate to equitable relief "a party must exercise reasonable
efforts to discharge his own obligations."
Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980).

Also Reed v. Alvey,

Wall Street Porperties v. Gossner,

Oregon, 632 P.2d 1310 (1981).
Only after it was apparent that a severe devaluation in the
property had occurred did the Defendant attempt to enforce the
agreement.

His performance at that time consisted of filing a

complaint.

He failed, even then, to tender a deed and title

insurance.
C.

Acts of Plaintiff are not consistent with the performance

of the agreement.

Mark McCracken attempted to assign his interest
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in Exhibit 1 to Zions First National Bank 6n the 10th day of
March, 1982, (See Ex. 13) and thereafter made a trust deed encumbering the land in question for the sum of $92,525.00 on the 27th
day of April, 1984.

(Ex. 14) (Ex. 13, 14 yere introduced at a

post judgment hearing to require executingjthe note and trust deed
by Defendants)
The act of attempting to assign the contract is inconsistent
with his representation that he has the ability to convey good
title.

The act of mortgaging the property is inconsistent with

his ability to give free and clear title, as shown by the policy
of title insurance he was obligated to deliver.

Each of these

acts is consistent with his intention to retain title, ownership
and control of the property as manifested j^n the office of
Attorney Barrett.

Each of these acts is a repudiation of the

agreement and an act which bars Plaintiff flrom performance of the
contract.

These acts induced these Defendants into taking a posi-

tion which is inconsistent with the Plaintijff's present claims.
Fischer v. Johnson, Supra.
D.

The contract is unenforceable by reason of the fact that

the Plaintiff has delayed enforcement of the agreement to the
disadvantage of the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff admits that he made no election to proceed with
the contract and that the deed, notes and mortgages were not
exchanged between the parties.

He further concedes that he has

retained the control over the property by taking the crops off the
property and/or leasing it out for his personal gain.
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The

Plaintiff commenced this action in April of 1984 when almost six
years after he had failed to elect to proceed and tender a deed
and three years after the meeting in Attorney Barrett's Office
where he represented to Attorney Barrett that he did not wish to
tender a deed but wanted to "leave the situation the way it is and
not have any deeds exchange hands yet".

The decision of the Trial

Court in ordering specific performance raises the issue as to
whether or not the Plaintiff can delay his performance for a
period of six years, all the while watching the property decline
in value to the disadvantage of the purchasers.

This action ws

brought after the note and mortgage would have been payable had
such documents been executed.

Had the Plaintiff brought this

action within a reason-able period of time the Defendants could
have complied with the agreement earlier to protect themselves.
It is the Plaintiff's position that the Trial Court's
judgment in enforcing the agreement after a delay of six years
constitutes error.
See the case of Papanikolas Brothers Ent. v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Center, Utah, 535 P.2d 1256, (1975), where the court said
as follows:
"Latches is not mere delay but delay that works advantage
to another. To constitute latches two elements must be
established: (1) lack of diligence on the part of the
plaintiff, and (2) an injury to the defendant owing to
such lack of diligence. Although lapse of time is an
essential part of latches, the length of time must depend
upon the circumstances of each case for the propriety of
refusing a claim as equally predicated upon the gravity
of the prejudice suffered by the defendant and the length
of plaintiff's delay."
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Since 1981 the property has devalued substantially as subdivision
property and the ability to sell the lots for a profit has been
reduced by the presence of a substantial recession.

If the

building boom had continued Plaintiff would have been able to
maintain control of his land, farm the uncjevelopment portion and
reaped a profit from the sale of lots.
However, upon the advent of the business recession the
Plaintiff realized that his prospect of profit through the sale of
lots was diminishing and that his continued ownership of the property was not making a profit as anticipated.

He, thereafter, in

1982 and 1984 purportedly assigned his interest in the agreement
and mortgaged the property to secure the payment of other indebtedness.

(See Ex. 13 and 14)

The last trust deed was dated the

27th day of March, 1984 and recorded on Aplril 27, 1984, 3 days
prior to the commencement of this action seeking specific performance.

The judgment of the Trial Court requires Defendants to

make and execute a note and trust deed two years delinquent.
Defendants are forced into immediate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings for the foreclosure of the trust deed and another suit
because Plaintiff failed to give marketable title to Defendants.
Plaintiff presently enjoys the benefit of a six-year-old bargain
in a declining economy.

The Plaintiff by virtue of the Trial

Court's judgment is given a "peek into the future" to select his
remedy regardless of whether or not his cqnduct is inconsistent or
consistent with that remedy.

The Supreme Court of the State of

Utah in the case of Mawhinney v. Jensen, 1J20 Utah, 142, 232 P. 2d
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769, (1951), held that a delay will bar equitable relief in a suit
for rescission.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF, AT THE TIxME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PURCHASE
AGREEMENT HAD NO AUTHORITY FROM CO-TENANTS TO SELL THE
PROPERTY, AND, THEREFORE, THE CONTRACT WAS INVALID.
On October 19, 1978, title to the subject property was vested
as follows:

One quarter, Mark McCracken; one quarter, Doris E.

McCracken; one-half, Kedrick McCracken and Lila P. McCracken as
trustees of the Kedrick McCracken Family Revocable Trust.
Mark McCracken claims to have acted as an agent for his aunt
and uncle to sell the property.

(TR 17)

He possessed a power-of-attorney executed by Kedrick
McCracken and Lila P. McCracken as individuals but not as
trustees.

(See Ex. 2)

Deeds for subdivided lots were signed by

Mark McCracken sometimes recognizing the trust relationship of
Kedrick and Lila P. McCracken and sometimes failing to recognize
the trust relationship of Kedrick and Lila P. McCracken.
Ex. 8)

(See

Clear title was not passed to the owners of the lots by

virtue of these title defects.

Jennings v. Murdock, Infra.

On

the 22nd day of April, 1984, approximately 8 days prior to the
commencement of this action Kedrick McCracken and Lila P.
McCracken, individually and as trustees of the Kedrick McCracken
Family Revocable Trust executed a warranty deed conveying the property to Mark McCracken.

(Note, Mark McCracken encumbered the

property to a bank 5 days later.)

It is suggested that the real

purpose of the deed was to provide a marketable title to facilitate the loan.
-20-

See Restatement of Trusts, Section 171 2d Note G.

Also see

Jennings v. Murdock, Kansas, 553 P.2d 846, (1976), where that
court set forth the generally accepted rule as follows:
"Generally speaking, the duty to administer a trust and
to exercise the discretion vested in him rests from the
trustee and cannot be delegated by hiiti to others."
If the trustees could not delegate their authority to sell
the property they could not execute a poweif-of-attorney as
trustees.

The power-of-attorney executed !f>y them as individuals

is of no force and effect by reason of the fact that the property
was held in trust.

Therefore, the recitation in paragraph 1 of

the agreement that the sellers were the owners of the real property was false.

McCracken further represented in paragraph 1

that the sellers agreed to sell all of the property described in
Exhibit "A" thus creating a second condition precedent of the sale
that all parties agree to the sale.

See Bifanstetter v. Cox,

Infra, where the court held that the husband's signature was a
condition precedent to the contract taking effect.
By the very terms of this agreement to sell "all" of the proerty the valid execution by "all" of the cfwners is a condition
precedent which has not been met.

The subsequent warranty deed

five years later does not fulfill the condition.

(See Point 1(C))

POINT III
THE PARTIES, BY THEIR CONDUCT, ESTABLISHED
A RELATIONSHIP AS JOINT VE^URERS.
The evidence in this case shows that the parties elected to
proceed to subdivide the property in the form of a joint venture

-21-

the terms of which are evidenced by the actions of the parties.
Attorney Barrett, in his memorandum indicates very clearly that
the parties elected not to proceed on the original agreement by
implementing its terms but elected to "leave the situation as it
is and not have any deeds exchange hands yet.

"Whenever they sell

a lot McCracken and Greaves and Downs all sign so there is no
problem passing title in that way".

Bassett v. Baker, Utah, 530

P.2d 1 (1974), defines the elements of a joint venture.
Contrary to the real estate agreement the parties mutually
subdivided the land with McCracken retaining an ownership interest
and control over the property so subdivided as evidenced by the
dedication plat.

(See Ex. 4)

For this Court to reach the conclu-

sion that the parties acted in a joint venture is not unreasonable
nor detrimental to the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has received his

share of the lots that were sold (TR 25), has retained the
ownership of the land for the purpose of taking crops from the
land and/or leasing the land to others for monetary gain.

He pre-

sently benefits by the zoning of the property, engineering and the
development that is presently in place.

(TR 118) Therefore, a

finding by this court of a joint venture places each party in the
proximate position they were in prior to the entry into the
contract with each party having profited insofar as the land was
sold and the profits divided.
CONCLUSION
A review of the many cases before this Court relative to a
specific performance reveals that in periods of economic

-22-

prosperity, purchasers bring the actions ^or specific performance.
In periods of a decline in the economy sellers bring the action.
In prosperity the seller retains the benefit of his bargain and
the purchaser may be entitled to the gain, in periods of a
declining market the seller wants the beneifit of his bargain at
the expense of the purchasers.

The greateir period of time a

seller in a declining market delays the commencement of the action
the greater the potential losses suffered by the buyer.

In this

action the seller has waited until the market value is approximately 50% of its prior value, as evidenced by the fact that the
Plaintiffs' mortgage on the property in 1984 was $92,525.00 and he
acknowledges a value of only $75,000 to $78,000.00 at the date of
trial.

(TR 65)

The Findings of Fact by the Court are not supported by the
evidence and the Conclusions of Law are clearly erroneous.

^he

Trial Court's judgment grants to the Plaintiff the right to have
his note and trust deed executed pursuant to the terms of a
contract he has refused to abide by, and was unwilling to perform.
The Plaintiff, by virtue of the Trial Court's decision, has
been given the unique opportunity of delaying his performance
under the agreement until the economic climate forecasts his best
option and then allowing the Plaintiff to benefit at the expense
of Defendants.

These Defendants, for the foregoing reasons,

request a reversal by this Court in accordance with the facts
introduced at the Trial Court and the laws of this State and a
finding of no cause of action upon Plaintiffs' Complaint.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ' ^ day of March, 1986.

^

HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS
By
George W. Preston
Attorney for Defendants & Appellants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the above and
foregoing DEFENDANTS' AND APPELLANTS' BRIEF to JAMES C. JENKINS &

ASSOCIATES, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, at 67 East 100
North, P. 0. Box 3700, Logan, Utah 84321 on this /'"""day of March,
1986.

•SMA

George W. Preston
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PURCHASE

AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered
October,

into this

-,/x. day of
/£-Jl

IA

1 9 7 8 , by and between JERRY DOWNS and JERALD GREAVES,

hereinafter referred

to as Purchasers and MARK McCRACKEK, on b e -

half of himself and as attorney

in fact for KEDH|ICK McCRACKEN and

LILA P. KcCRACKEN, husband and wife, and DORIS Ei. K C C R A C K E N ,
inafter collectively

referred

to as Sellers, is hade with

here-

reference

to the following fc.cts:
WHEREAS, Selltrs

are the owners of certain heal property

in the

City of Srr.ithfield, County of Cache, State of Ut^h, consisting of
9.57 acres, more or- less, a more particular description
is attached hereto and incorporated

herein as Exhibit

WHEREAS, Buyers are desirous of purchasing
envelopment

of which

"A", and

said property for

and subdivision and Sellers are a^ree^able to selling the

N O W , THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Sellers agree to sell and Buyers agree to purchase all

of the property described

in Exhibit

"A" attached hereto, ccr.s 1st :r.<:

-•f 9.57 acres more or less, in the City of S-.i thfji el d, County of
Cache, State of Utah, and Buyers agree to pay for| said

described

property the amounts, in installments as follows:!
a.

As a ilownpayment, Buyers agree to rky

to Sellers cor.-

te-.perarieous with the execution of this Agre^rivrnt , the rum ;'f
Five Hundred

Dollars

( $ 5 0 0 . 0 0 ) , receipt of which is acknowledjed

by the Sellers.
b.

Buyers agree to pay an additional Orje Hundred

nine Thou::;.nd, Five Hundred
of aiNote secured
S^id

Dollars (1179,500.00) in the

by a Deed of Trust] on the described

Note shall be payable

SeventyCorn

property.

in full on the First of Sept^-.ber, 19 S 3,

Provided, however, th.it, whenever Buyers shaljl sell a lot or
portion of the described

property, they shall pay cr.o-h.^lf cf

the gross f\le pri^e less real estate commissions,

if cr.y, cf

CHASE AGREEKKKT
age Two

said lot to Sellers to apply on said Note.
"~

c.

Provided,

further, that Buyers and Seller,

agree

that the Buyers are preparing a preliminary plat for subdivision which will subdivide the property into twenty-seven
lots and that buyers will- sell said lots at the best
price.

(27)

available

If, after all o*" the lots hBv-- been sold, more than a

gross sales price of Three Hundred and Sixty Thousand

dollars

( $ 3 6 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) , less any real estate commissions, has been
by the Buyers, then Sellers shall receive as additional

realized

compensa-

tion for the purchase and sale of their property, one-half

(1/2)

of all of the proceeds from the sale of said lots exceeding
$360,000.00.
2.

It i3 further understood and agreed that the Buyers

shall be the developers and subdividers and that Sellers sh3ll have
no part in nor control over the subdivision or sale of the said
lots.
3.

Closing of thin Agreement by Sellers deeding

subject property to the Buyers and Buyers delivering

the

their Note

and Deed of Trust to the Sellers shall be on or before November 20,
1 9 7 8 , at the sole election of the S e l l e r s .
*J.

It is agreed

that this entire Agreement

ic contingent

upon approval of a final plat of subdivision being approved
City of £.7:i thf ield.

In the event said plat

is not approved

by the
Cor

iny

reason within one year from the date of this Agreement, then the
B u y e r s , at their option, may recind
described
\'cte.

the agreement by deeding

the

property back to the Sellers in return for the Pro.T.i ssrry

In s-jeh event, the Sellers shall retain the Five 'iundrr-d r»o!l:-.r

(£500.00)

downpayment.
5.

It is understood and agreed

that Buyers shall pay

all subdivision and development costs, including real estate tax.-s
after the calendar year 1 9 7 8 .
property taxes assessed against
.6.

w

Sellers shall pay the 1973 real
the subject

property.

Sel lers a/;re 3 to provide to Buyers a policy of title

. i.r.-suranqe"'}: :.,!£*;• lie.-/?;; ,i,tr>:pc-nr.e within ninety

»y>.:p<-'

(00) days .ifier the

J'ASE AGKEEKENT
ire Three

execution of this
"

' 7.

Agreement.

As Buyers sell any lot or lots, the Seller agrees to

execute and deliver to the designated

title company a reconveyance

from the Deed of Trust on any such lots, releasing said lots from the
lien of the Deed of Trust.
8.

This Agreement

constitutes-the entire agreement of

the parties hereto and no amendments or changes i$ay be made except
in writing, executed
9.

by the party to be charged.

This Agreement

shall be binding upon the heirs, exec-

utors, successors and assigns of the parties herejto,

DATED this

/y^' day of M ' 7 > / ^ - ^

1J978.

SELLERS:

SUYEF.S:

-?&

S

JzrryDowns

Mark

On behalf of himself and as
Attorney in Fact for:

a •
-ULr^TrCril-r-

Jc-rald

& t

f<£
McCracken

Kedrick McCracken and
Lila P. McCracken, husband
and wife, and

Greaves

/

Doris E. HeCracken

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
County of Cache)

s s.

On this _Jj_l-_

day of Oc£ak<r

, 1978, personally

appeared

before me JERRY DOWNS, JERALD GREAVES and MARK McC^:AKEK', the
signers of the foregoing
that they executed

instrument, who duly acknowledged

the same.

'•^'otary
Commission e x p i r e s :
Fosiding in

/>Uy /^

/ ^ a >/ j Cucla

/fzz
&«><l*f > lo'J^

Public

to me

James C. Jenkins
JAMES C. JENKINS & ASSOCIATES
67 East 100 North
P.O. Box 3700
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-4107
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

MARK MCCRACKEN, KENDRICK
MCCRACKEN, LILA P. MCCRACKEN
and DORIS E. McCRACKEN
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff
vs.
JERRY DOtft'S and JERALD
GREAVES

Civil No. 22759

Defendant
This matter having been heretofore tri^d before the honorable
VeNoy Christoffersen, in the above-entitled court without jury
on July 8, 1985, and pursuant to request of the Court the parties
having filed their respective trial briefs and the court having
received the same and also having heard oral arguments of counsel
for the parties on the 26th day of September, 1985 and the court
after oral arguments having rendered its final findings of fact
and conclusions of law does hereby reduce the same to writing.
1.

This action involves real property located in

Smithfield, Cache County, Utah as described in Plaintiff's
Complaint and a contract for the sale and purchase of said
property between the Plaintiffs and Defendants.
2.

Pursuant to negotiations initiated by Defendants,

Plaintiffs on or about October 19, 1978, ex lecuted that certain

Purchase Agreement of even date and a d m i t t e d

1

tu-

into

IJ(L !.-.U

evidence

fi

-7C6

trial.
3.

Under the contract the sum of $500.00 was paid to

Plaintiffs by Defendants as a down payment and over a period of
time an additional $29,500.00 was paid, leaving an outstanding
balance (as of the last payment made in September of 1980) of
$149,500.00.

Although the contract requires that a note and

trust deed be executed by the Defendant Buyers evidencing and
securing the remaining unpaid balance due under the contract, no
such note or trust deed was ever executed or delivered to
Plaintiffs and consequently no Warranty Deed was executed and
delivered to the Defendants conveying the property.
4.

The contract further provided that Defendants would pay

all subdivision and development costs including real estate taxes
after the calendar year 1978.

The contract further provided that

the Promissory Note was due and payable in full on the first day
of September, 1 983.
5.

Plaintiffs fully performed under the contract except to

provide a deed to the property and that had not been provided
because Defendants had failed to deliver a note and Trust Deed as
required under the contract.

In April of 1984, Plaintiffs,

Kendrick and Lila McCracken, deeded individually and as Trustees
all their interest in the subject real property of this action to
Plaintiff Mark Cecil McCracken.
6.

On September 1, 1983, the remaining outstanding balance

due under the contract was $149,500.00 which sum has not since
been paid by the Defendants.

The court having made the following

findings of fact makes the following conclusions of law:

f "•

*•

7

1.

The contract entered into between the parties on or

about O^tober 19, 1978, is binding upon the parties and
enforceable,
2.

The balance due under the contract as of September 1,

1983, is $149,500.00.
3.

Any possible defect in title or the ability of

Plaintiff, Mark Cecil McCracken to convey title in a condition as
required under the contract, particularly because of defective
powers of attorney was cured by the executioti, delivery and
recording of that certain Special Warranty Deed dated April 23,
1984, from Kendrick and Lila McCracken to Mark Cecil McCracken.
4.

Jerry Downs and Gerald Greaves are liable and obligated

to execute and deliver a Promissory Note in the principal amount
of $179,500.00 dated October 19, 1978, payable to Mark McCracken
and due and payable on the first day of September, 1983, and to
execute and deliver a Deed of Trust securing the payment of said
note and pledging the subject real property bf this action for
that purpose and granting a right of deficiency in the event of
foreclosure should the sale of the property fail to pay all sums
due on an after September 1, 1983.
5.

An order of this court should be entered compelling

Defendants Jerry Downs and Gerald Greaves to execute a Promissory
Note and Deed of Trust in accordance with th^ provisions of the
foregoing conclusion of law, and finding that the balance due

u,

fil-.i

S

under said note as of September 1, 1983, was $149,500.00 and that
Plaintiffs are entitled to exercise all rights and remedies of
foreclosure and collection of deficiency.
DATED this

\1^

day of

11 fv-Gyv.^6
ien>

1985.

Distri/ct \Jud

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was hand delivered to George Preston, attorney for
Defendant, at 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah this o^-?/ ~

dyhbejT

. 1985.
^

^

/

()i :>.:

(j

day of

James C. Jenkins
JAMES C. JENKINS & ASSOCIATES
67 East 100 North
P.O. Box 3700
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-4107
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, pOUNTY OF CACHE
MARK MCCRACKEN, KENDRICK
MCCRACKEN, LILA P. MCCRACKEN
and DORIS E. McCRACKEN
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
vs.
JERRY DOWNS and JERALD
GREAVES

Civil No^ 22759

Defendant
This matter having come on regularly before the Court after
trial and the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now therefore,
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES

as follbws:

1. Defendant Jerry Downs and Jerald Greaves are hereby
ordered to execute forthwith a Note and Deid of Trust in the form
and upon the terms set forth in the attached Exhibit "A" and MB,!
and deliver the same to James C. Jenkins, attorney for
Plaintiffs,
2.

The remaining outstanding balance [due under said

Promissory Note as of September 1, 1983, is the sum of
$149,500.00.
3.

Plaintiffs are and shall be entitled to exercise and

enforce all rights and remedies provided under said Note and Deed
of Trust to include rights of foreclosure ^nd recovery of any
resulting deficiencies, judicially or non-jjudicially.
i

t-\

Hi

'D9 '?S

4.

Plaintiffs upon delivery of said executed note and Deed

of Trust shall cause to be recorded a Warranty Deed conveying the
subject property to Defendants and concurrently therewith the
Trust Deed pledging said property as security for the payment of
said Note. Said Warranty Deed shall be in the form and upon the
terms and conditions set forth in the attached Exhibit "C" and
incorporated herein by reference.
5.

In addition to the foregoing Plaintiffs are awarded

their costs of Court. The parties shall bear their own attorneys
fees and other costs.
DATED this

J7-

day of

H I K ^ W U ^

, 1985.

• i

/

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was hand delivered to George Preston at 31 Federal Avenue,
Logan, Utah, this ^gj~*

day of (Ocboke.f~>

1985.

C7)

\\\

.•.« 1 1

